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THE HATEFULNESS OF PROTECTED SPEECH:
A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN
APPROACHES
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott
In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has
construed very broadly the constitutional protection of free speech. Similarly
democratic governments in Europe, however, have adopted laws restricting certain
types of speech-particularly hate speech-based on the view that the human rights
of oppressed groups cannot be protected fully if hate speech is permitted In this
provocative Article, Professor Douglas-Scott briefly examines the American
approach and contrasts it with the rationale underpinning European, especially
German, law. Focusing on hate speech and the denial of the Holocaust voiced
largely by neo-Nazi and other right-wing groups, she argues that such speech poses
problems for society that are not addressed most effectively by strict adherence to
unfettered free expression.
Recent attempts by German authorities to impose state censorship on the Internet,
by pressurizing commercial providers to block access to material considered illegal
under German law, have received considerable attention. The highly publicized
conviction of Felix Somm, manager of CompuServe's German operations, for
complicity in transmitting child pornography and the dissemination of Nazi symbols,
illustrates the willingness of German prosecutors to regulate the Internet and to use
Lecturer in Law, King's College London. Visiting Professor, University of Bonn, and
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California. Many thanks
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article are due to Andrew Ashworth, Tom
Campbell, Keith Ewing, John Gardner, Nicola Lacey, Brian Landsberg, Maleiha Malik, and
Peter Oliver.
I Unless otherwise noted, all translations of German law into English are by the author.
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censorship aggressively in acting against neo-Nazis.' This conviction also illustrates
an approach to freedom of expression which stands in bold contrast to that of the
United States Supreme Court, which in 1997 struck (lown provisions of the
Communications Decency Act stating, "[t]he interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit
of censorship."2 Somm's conviction is unlikely to stand and, in any case, recent
legislation in Germany specifies that on-line service providers are not responsible for
material transmitted online if they have no means of filtering out the offending
material.3 Apart from the emotive issues of Internet regulation, however, the Somm
case illustrates that recent racial hatred legislation, not only in Germany but also in
other European countries, permits restriction of freedom of expression which would
not be permissible in the United States.
Attempts to censor certain types of racist or discriminatory speech raise the
vexing question of whether governments should outlaw the expression of views that
society generally abhors. In a recent article entitled Should Wrong Opinions Be
Banned?," Ronald Dworkin takes a firm position with respect to this subject.
Dworkin criticizes the prohibition in Germany of racist invective and concludes: "We
must not endorse the principle that opinion may be banned when those in power are
persuaded that it is false and that some group would be deeply and understandably
wounded by its publication. '
Dworkin's view is based on a liberal justification of freedom of speech, namely,
that free speech promotes certain key values such as individual autonomy and
democracy (in that people should be able to decide for themselves which political and
societal views should prevail). This view is also prevalent in the approach taken by
the United States Supreme Court in its First Amendment jurisprudence, and it
Somm was charged under sections 27 and 184 of the German Criminal Code,
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] §§ 27 & 184 Nr. 3 (F.R.G.), and convicted on May 27, 1998. He
received a suspended sentence and a fine of 100,000 DM (approximately $56,000). See Head
of German Web sentenced for pornography, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at A3; Ex-
CompuServe official convicted in German court, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at A6.
2 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997).
The German prosecutors have taken the unusual step of appealing the CompuServe
conviction which means that the case could go straight to the Bavarian State Supreme Court.
In August 1997, the German Parliament passed the German multimedia law, which specifies
that online providers are not liable if they do not have the technology to block the material,
and it was on the basis of that law that the prosecutors asked for an acquittal. Gesetz zur
Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen fbr Informations und Kommunikationsdienste (Federal
Law to Regulate the Conditions for Information and Communications Services) [IuKDG],
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TElL I [BGBI. I] v. 22.7.97 (BGBI. I S. 1870) (F.R.G.).
' Ronald Dworkin, Should Wrong Opinions Be Banned?, INDEPENDENT (London), May
28, 1995, at 27.
' Id. Dworkin expresses similar views in Liberty and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Aug. 15, 1991, at 15.
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contrasts with the more interventionist approach found in Europe. However, not
everyone shares Dworkin's view-there is now a growing body of criticism on the
near absolute strength of freedom of speech in the United States. These critics assert
that it is better to allow inroads into freedom of expression than to continue
permitting the harm caused by certain verbal utterances.6 This Article will
demonstrate that some criticisms such as these are well-grounded, and that some
types of speech produce problems for contemporary society that are not addressed
most effectively by strict adherence to unfettered free expression. In so doing, this
Article will focus in particular on hate speech and Holocaust denial,7 and will engage
in a comparison of the German case law denigrated by Dworkin (as well as other
European precedents) with the more absolutist and pro-free speech approach of First
Amendment jurisprudence in the United States.
I. PRELUDE: CASE COMPARISONS
A comparison of two similar cases clearly highlights the distinctions between the
American and European approaches to speech. The holdings in each case concerned
the issue of whether the proscription of certain types of expression, on the grounds
of its racist nature, offends the principle of freedom of speech.
In April of 1994, the German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, held that it was not contrary to Article 5(1) of the German Basic Law,8 which
provides for freedom of expression, to ban an assembly in Munich at which the
"revisionist historian" David Irving would be questioning the extent of the Jewish
Holocaust during the Third Reich.9 The court held that the ban on the assembly and
the consequent restriction of Irving's exercise of free speech were compatible with
the German Constitution and authorized under certain provisions of the German
Criminal Code, including those provisions that specifically set forth the offense of
denying the Holocaust."
6 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320
(1989).
7 This Article focuses on hate and discriminatory speech, but many of the arguments
made here also may apply to pornography. See MACKINNON, supra note 6, passim.
8 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5 Nr. 1 (F.R.G.).
9 See Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht, Apr. 23, 1994, reported in Neue Juristiche
Wochenschrift [NJW] 1994, at 1779, discussed in greater depth infra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text.
" See id. at 1779; see also §§ 130 & 194 StGB.
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In contrast, in the well-known American case of Collin v. Smith," the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the First Amendment 2 protected from prior
restraint the planned march of a group of neo-Nazis through Skokie, Illinois, a suburb
of Chicago where a large number of Holocaust survivors lived 3 and which was
chosen by the neo-Nazis for precisely that reason. The court held that the march was
protected speech, and it invalidated Skokie's anti-defamation law by which the
Village sought to prevent the march.' 4 The Seventh Circuit held that protection of
the sort of expression engaged in by the neo-Nazis in Skokie was the necessary price
of liberty in America: "It is, after all, in part the fact that our constitutional system
protects minorities unpopular at a particular time or place from governmental
harassment and intimidation, that distinguishes life in this country from life under the
Third Reich."' 5
In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,6 the United States Supreme Court more recently
spelled out the reasoning underlying the Seventh Circuit's holding in Collin. The
facts in RA. V concerned the burning of a crudely made cross (with the clear intent
to intimidate) on the lawn of a black family that had moved into a formerly all white
neighborhood.' 7 The defendant, Robert Allen Viktora (R.A.V.),' was charged under
the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. 9 According to this ordinance, anyone
who "places on public or private property a symbol, [or] object ... including.., a
burning cross ... which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct."2 The Supreme Court held that the St. Paul ordinance
was unconstitutional and that the charge must be dismissed.2' The local law offended
the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment because it "prohibit[ed]... speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech address[ed]. 22
Collin and R.A. V are paradigmatic examples of the approach taken by American
courts. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of First
" 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
12 U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech . . . ."). The First Amendment's guarantee also is applicable to state law by
incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
"3 See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1199.
14 See id. at 1218-19.
"S Id. at 1201.
16 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
'7 See id. at 379.
"8 The defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime and, thus, the Court identified
him only by his initials.
'9 ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990), quoted in R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380.
20 Id., quoted in R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380.
21 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 396.
22 Id. at 381.
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Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech through its decisions in a large family
of cases this century, to which these two cases belong.23 In this context, Ronald
Dworkin recently commented: "The United States stands alone even among
democracies, in the extraordinary degree to which its [C]onstitution protects freedom
of speech and of the press."'24 This strong belief in freedom of speech, backed up as
it has been by the use of metaphors such as "the marketplace of ideas," applies not
only in the area of hate speech, but also to other highly contested areas of discourse
such as pornography, in which the value of the "speech" concerned seems to be as
low as hate speech."
In contrast, controls on free speech long have been permitted in many European
countries to curb incitement to race hatred and other undesirable motivations.26 The
European Union declared 1997 a year of action against racism, and the Council of
the European Union recently reached agreement on a text proposing joint action
against racism and xenophobia, which would cover denial of the Holocaust and a
wide range of hate crimes.2
It is, perhaps, all too easy to attempt to justify the existence of such statutory
curbs on free speech in Europe as the products of very different histories,
circumstances, and ideologies than those of the United States. The United States did
not suffer the totalitarian dictatorships of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s nor their
disastrous consequences in the form of widespread anti-semitism, persecution, and
23 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag-burning is protected
by the First Amendment as a form of political speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (holding that a state may not criminalize the mere public display of an expletive);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that a state may not forbid advocacy of
the use of force or violation of a law unless the advocacy is intended or likely to incite or
produce such action); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a
public official must prove "actual malice" in order to recover damages for defamation
relating to his or her official conduct). But see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 505 U.S. 476 (1993)
(holding that the application of a penalty enhancement statute to a racist conviction did not
breach the First Amendment).
24 Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 11,
1992, at 55.
25 Obscenity, as distinguished from pornography, is subject to regulation. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (setting forth guidelines by which states
constitutionally may regulate obscene material).
26 See, e.g., Public Order Act, 1986, Part III (U.K.) (proscribing racially inflammatory
material as well as acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred). In Germany, the
"Auschwitzlolge" offense (literally, "lie of Auschwitz" offense) under sections 130 and 194
of the Criminal Code prohibits the approval, trivialization, or denial of Nazi crimes or the
crimes of other violent regimes. §§ 130 & 194 StGB. Both the United Kingdom and the
German provisions are discussed infra.
27 Joint Action against Racism 96/443/JHA, 1996 O.J. (L 185) 5. The Council agreed to
the joint action on July 15, 1996, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of European
Union.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
genocide. Nor has the United States had to confront the immediate consequences of
the break up of the Soviet Union and Comecon. One such consequence has been the
migration of large numbers of people to Westem Europe, particularly to Germany
(which until recently had extremely liberal asylum laws),2" and the aggressive
reaction from the resident population. Even if one excludes the horrific ethnic
conflict in Bosnia, the incidence of racism, xenophobia, and hate crimes in Europe
has increased.29 Furthermore, the movement toward a united European Union with
increasingly open borders is another factor capable of shaking the identity of
Europeans. Physical borders, along with their legal and political significance, often
assume cultural and psychological significance. When borders are eroded by such
radical events as the fall of the Iron Curtain and the projects of the European Union
for an ever closer union, national identity can be shaken. A result of such shaken
identities may be the triggering of primitive psychological defense mechanisms and
the projection of aggressive emotions onto vulnerable groups. 30 Restrictions on
hateful and racist speech may be seen therefore as attempts to prohibit such
inappropriately aggressive conduct and to express the distaste of nations and their
citizens for it.
Not all of these circumstances are unique to Europe, though. Solutions to the
problem of discrimination and racist speech have been sought beyond European
borders. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination requires contracting states to "declare [as] an offence
punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. 31
The South African constitution, for example, excludes "hate speech" from the
protection of free speech. 32 The Canadian Supreme Court has shown itself willing
28 Article 16(a) of the German Basic Law provides that "persons persecuted on political
grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum." Art. 16(a) GG. On May 28, 1993, the German
Parliament voted to limit its policies on political asylum, and a new, more restrictive, Article
16(a) has since been enacted. See Friedrich Schoch, Das neue Asylrecht gemdfl Art. 16(a)99,
108 DEUTCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1161-70 (1993).
29 See European Parliament, Resolution on the communication from the Commission on
racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism, 1996 O.J. (C 152) 57.
30 See, e.g., Avner Falk, Border Symbolism, 43 PSYCHO-ANALYTIC Q. 650 (1974).
" International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
This treaty has not been ratified yet by the United States, and probably will not be due to its
inconsistencies with the First Amendment.
32 The relevant provision reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to
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to regulate speech when it conflicts with claims of equality. In Regina v. Keegstra,3
a Canadian teacher who had described Jews as "treacherous," "money loving" "child
killers" who had "created the Holocaust to gain sympathy" was convicted under
section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code which prohibits communicating
statements that wilfully promote hatred against any identifiable group distinguished
by color, race, religion, or ethnic origin.34 The Supreme Court of Canada justified
the conviction under section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which guarantees rights and
freedoms "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."35 In his opinion for the
court, Chief Justice Dickson reasoned: "Expression intended to promote the hatred
of identifiable groups is of limited importance when measured against free expression
values" because it contributes little to truth and tends to frustrate the autonomy and
political expression of members of the targeted groups.36 This opinion contrasts
sharply with those of the American courts in Collin and R.A. V
The United States' history of slavery and race discrimination, along with a
dramatic increase in the incidence of hate related crimes," also might seem tojustify
prohibition of the sort of conduct which took place in Collin and R.A. V Yet, the
prevailing view in America, and more particularly, the Supreme Court, still seems to
oppose such action, even given the harm that racial invective causes. Ronald
Dworkin expresses, in terms redolent of Collin, the perceived merits of such an
attitude: "Decent people are impatient with abstract principles when they see
hoodlums with pseudo-swastikas pretending that the most monumental, cold-blooded
(a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion,
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.
S. AFR. CONST. § 16 (1996). For a sympathetic commentary on § 16(2)(c), see Franz
Auerbach, Warning: Hate Speech Can Kill-and that is not a human right to be enshrined
in a constitution, SUN. INDEP. (South Africa), Dec. 10, 1995, at 5 (providing an interesting
contrast to Dworkin's argument).
33 [19901 3 S.C.R. 697.
31 See id. at 714-16.
31 Id. at 734 (quoting § 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); see also id.
at 717 (explaining that § 2(b) of the Canadian Charter guarantees "freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication").
The Canadian Charter is modeled on the limiting provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"), such as Article 10(2). See Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10(2), reprinted
in FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 222 (2d ed. 1996).
36 Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 762.
37 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, F.B.I., HATE CRIME STATISTICS 5-18 (1995).
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genocide ever was the invention of its victims. But freedom is important enough for
sacrifices that really hurt."38
A close examination of American case law and of the traditional arguments in
favor of free speech, however, fails to disclose sufficient justification for these
"sacrifices." First, this Article briefly examines the basis and logic of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The second section contrasts the European approach
with the American approach (with special attention to the German provisions
criticized by Dworkin) and identifies an alternative theory of expression in Europe,
which allows restrictions on speech on the basis of its content. The third section
considers the theoretical justifications for a more absolutist approach and finds all of
them wanting. The final section draws together the various threads and makes the
case for a less absolutist approach to expression.
II. FREE SPEECH IN AMERICAN CASE LAW
The roots of freedom of speech as a value can be traced back to the seventeenth
century. John Milton, in his famous essay Areopagitica, celebrated the virtues of free
speech and tolerance.39 He continued the essay, however, by writing that speech
disrespectful to the Church ("tolerated popery, and open superstition"4 ) could be
punished by "fire and the executioner."' According to Milton, "that also which is
impious or evil absolutely either against faith or manners" could not be tolerated by
any law "that intends not to unlaw itself."'42
Milton's reservations, however, have been either forgotten or ignored (perhaps
wisely, given his suggested remedies) by the judges and scholars who have
constructed a First Amendmentjurisprudence this century. In this context, one of the
prevailing judicial images and the bedrock of First Amendment doctrine is the well-
known Holmesian market metaphor. In Abrams v. United States,43 decided in 1919,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in dissent:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
38 Dworkin, supra note 4, at 27.
39 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 60 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 64.
42 Id at 60.
" 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."
These strong words have cast their spell over First Amendment jurisprudence for
over half a century.4"
Another pillar of the temple of First Amendment jurisprudence is found in
Whitney v. California,' which concerned the prosecution of Anita Whitney under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act for her participation in meetings of the
California Communist Labor Party convention.47 In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Louis Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, wrote:
[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.... [N]o danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.4"
For Brandeis, counter-persuasion, not prohibition, was the best remedy. Another
pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence surely must be the principle of prohibiting
"content regulation" which has emerged in more recent case law-that is, the view
that some messages should not be favored over others on the basis that one prefers
the message they contain. The majority opinion in R.A. V., penned by Justice Scalia,
provides a good illustration of this principle in action. In R.A. V, the majority stated
that "[the City of] St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." '49
However, in spite of its apparent aversion to any content-based regulation of speech,
the United States Supreme Court never has held that all speech benefits from First
Amendment protection. Some types of speech really are less "free" than others -- a
fact that should make the United States wonder whether "liberal" free speech
jurisprudence really is so averse to banning "wrong" opinions.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'5 Questions still need to be asked about the operation of this marketplace of ideas: Is it
possible for all ideas to find their way into this Holmesian marketplace? How is a society to
avoid ideological monopolies? (This is the traditional problem of an unregulated market.)
46 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
41 See id. at 359-60.
48 Id. at 375-77 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
49 R.A. V., 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 60-75.
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A. The Apotheosis of Political Speech
Under the First Amendment, freedom of speech is most crucial in the area of
political speech. According to the "clear and present danger" test,5 all political
speech is permitted unless it immediately threatens public safety. Political speech is
defined very widely including, for example, the money contributed to finance
political campaigns.52 According to this doctrine, the political arena should be a
neutral forum for the expression of all points of view-even if those views actually
are not expressed in words, but by so-called "symbolic speech." In addition to
monetary contributions to political campaigns, salient examples include conduct such
as entering a courtroom with a shirt bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" '53 or burning
the American flag.54
Furthermore, this privileging of political speech has contaminated the law of
defamation. In the seminal case of New York Times v. Sullivan,55 the Supreme Court
held that a public official could not win a libel verdict against the press unless the
official proved that a statement made about him or her was not only false and
damning but made with "actual malice"-that is, that the journalist published the
statement either knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard for its veracity.56
The Court based this decision on the principle that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public officials."57 The Court
continued, noting a lower court's statement: "Whatever is added to the field of libel
is taken from the field of free debate."58 The Justices' primary concern seemed to be
that any other rule would operate to chill those who would give voice to public
criticism. This approach is in striking contrast to the (astonishing) law in some
European countries (at least prior to challenge under the European Convention) in
which truth, even if established, may be insufficient as a defense to actions for
insulting the government. 59
s' See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (setting forth the "clear and present
danger" test); discussion infra accompanying notes 63-67. Pertinent applications of the test
are discussed supra in text accompanying notes 11-25.
52 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
14 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56 Id. at 279-80.
17 Id. at 270.
" Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942)).
'9 This approach was the law in Spain prior to the challenge brought under the European
Convention in Castells v. Spain, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445 (1992). See also Lingens v. Austria,
8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (1986) (holding that journalist Lingens' defamation conviction under
Austrian law for criticizing a government minister violated Article 10 of the European
[Vol. 7:2
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B. The First Amendment Is Not an Absolute: Other Categories of Speech Are
Less Well-Protected
Some categories of speech, nevertheless, are excluded from the constitutional
haven of the First Amendment, although the scope of these exclusions seems to be
narrowing all the time. Obscene speech remains unprotected 6 -- although
distinguishing between what is obscene and what is not remains perplexing. For
example, pornography that subordinates women still may be protected as speech.6
Commercial speech usually has been considered to be protected by the First
Amendment, although it commands a lesser degree of protection than political
speech 62-a substantial state interest must be found to justify restrictions on
professional or commercial advertising.
Justice Holmes was responsible for one of the other seminal passages in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes first employed the "clear and present danger"
test in his 1919 opinion in Schenck v. United States63 as a means of placing some,
albeit minimal, constraints on the free marketplace of ideas. In Schenck he wrote:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. '
Over the next few decades, the Supreme Court applied the clear and present
danger test more and more strictly. In the 1950s, "clear and present danger" took a
particularly draconian turn, being used to sanction the conviction of Communist Party
organizers merely for advocating-but not actually plotting-the overthrow and
destruction of the United States government by force and violence.65 By 1969,
Convention).
60 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
61 For example, as Catharine MacKinnon notes, screenings of the film Deep Throat are
still permitted, notwithstanding the extremely explicit nature of the film and the possible
exploitation of the actress involved. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
128-130 (1987).
62 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (limiting courts'
scrutiny of state regulation of commercial advertizing).
63 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919) (upholding petitioner's conviction for publishing anti-war
statements during World War I).
64 Id. at 52.
65 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (rejecting the "contention that
success or probability of success" of petitioners' implicit plot to overthrow the government
is a necessary criterion for invoking the clear and present danger doctrine). Despite the
absence of any direct evidence of an actual plan by petitioner to overthrow the government,
because of their adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which advocates violent revolution
as a means of toppling capitalist governments, the trial court found petitioners as a matter of
fact to advocate such direct action. See id. at 497-98.
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however, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,' the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux
Klan leader who was convicted, under an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute, of
advocating violence as a means of political reform. The Court held that the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech did not allow "a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." '67
The "fighting words" doctrine, enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,68
is also often thought to provide another exception to the free speech doctrine. In
Chaplinsky, the Court affirmed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for calling a
city marshal "a damned Fascist" (under a state law which prohibited calling someone
an offensive or derisive name) and held:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.... [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.
69
The fighting words doctrine may be capable of prohibiting some hate speech,
given the ability of such speech to inflict great injury. Indeed, on the basis of the
fighting words doctrine, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 70 the Supreme Court somewhat
surprisingly upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois group defamation law.7' Under
that law, the petitioner had been convicted for distributing leaflets of the White Circle
League, a white supremacist organization.72 Over the past few decades, however, the
fighting words doctrine has been restricted and it is doubtful whether Beauharnais
66 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
67 Id. at 447.
68 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69 Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted). The similarity between-the language used here and
that in the opinion of Chief Judge Dickson in Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697, 766, is striking. See
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
70 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
" See id. at 266.
72 See id. at 252. This leaflet contained, inter alia, the following passage: "If persuasion
and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not
unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro,
surely will." Id.
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still is good law. Following Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court now insists that in order
to be constitutionally proscribed, the speech in question must be intended to bring
about imminent violence."
Existing American case law, therefore, makes it very difficult to prohibit conduct
such as that of the neo-Nazis marching through Skokie. A strong antipathy to
content-based regulation of speech within protected categories,7 a along with the near
eclipse of the fighting words doctrine, makes any legislative attempts to prohibit
racist (or otherwise wounding) speech (actual or symbolic) constitutionally suspect,
no matter how shocking, wounding, or offensive that speech may be. The First
Amendment protects the flag burning in Texas v. Johnson" that shocked Middle
America as much as it protects the hateful expression in R.A. V But Middle America
is large and secure, whereas minority groups are small in number, and often
vulnerable. The danger exists that, without some intervention, content neutrality
allows certain groups to skew debate with the result that not all voices are heard.76
III. CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE SPEECH IN EUROPE
In contrast to American First Amendment jurisprudence, European judges have
shown themselves far more willing to countenance restrictions on freedom of
expression. Several European countries have implemented statutes prohibiting
incitement to race hatred which probably would not withstand constitutional scrutiny
in American courts.
For example, in the United Kingdom, Part III of the Public Order Act of 198677
prohibits behavior intended to or likely to have the result of stirring up racial hatred.
In the United Kingdom, "racial hatred" is defined as hatred against a group of
persons defined by reference to color, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origin.78
'3 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,409 (1989); NAACP v. Claibome Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982).
74 This antipathy seems to exist even outside of such protected categories. See Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). While acknowledging
that the St. Paul ordinance fell within the fighting words doctrine, Justice Scalia also stated
that content regulation within an excluded category still was not permissible. See R.A. V, 505
U.S. at 393-96. See also discussion supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (discussing
R.A. V.'s facts and holding).
" 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
76 See Fiss, supra note 6, at 21 ("[T]he principle [of content neutrality] should not be
extended to situations like hate speech, pornography and political expenditures, in which
private parties are skewing debate and the state regulation promotes free and open debate.").
17 See Public Order Act, 1986, Part III (U.K.) (proscribing acts intended or likely to stir
up racial hatred as well as racially inflammatory material). This Act subsequently was
amended by § 164 of the Broadcasting Act of 1990.
78 Public Order Act, 1986, § 17. This statute is broad in scope and includes within its
prohibitions behavior, the use of words, the display of written material, public performance
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However, the provision has not been used widely. Furthermore, the provision in the
United Kingdom's laws does not criminalize the dissemination of racist propaganda
per se absent likelihood that race hatred will be stirred up. In 1997, a member of the
House of Commons introduced an unsuccessful Private Member's Bill in an attempt
to make the denial of the Holocaust a criminal offense in the United Kingdom.79
Under this Bill, a bare denial of the Holocaust would have been deemed sufficient
in itself to stir up racial hatred.
Throughout continental Europe, a number of other jurisdictions restrict racist
speech. In France, the so-called Gayssot Act states that imprisonment of up to one
year or a fine of up to 300,000 francs, or both, "shall be applied to anyone who
contests... the existence of one or several crimes against humanity as defined in
Article 6 of the International Military Tribunal."8 It was under this statute that
Robert Faurisson, Professor of Literature at the University of Lyon, was convicted
for publishing his contention that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz." In
Austria, it is an offense "if in print, over the radio or through another medium or
otherwise on a public manner accessible to many people," a person "denies, grossly
trivialises, approves or seeks to justify the national socialist genocide or other
national socialist crimes against humanity." 2 On a regional level, the European
Union adopted a Joint Action on the basis of Article K3 of the Treaty of European
of a play, distributing, showing or playing a recording of visual images or sounds (such as
a program in a television or radio broadcasting service) and possession of racially
inflamrmatory written material. Offenses are committed if the words, behavior, etc. are
"threatening, abusive or insulting," and if they are intended to stir up racial hatred or,
considering all the circumstances, if racial hatred is likely to be stirred up. Exceptions are
provided for situations in which the activity takes place within a private house. There also
is a defense when the words or behavior, etc., are not intended to be threatening, abusive or
insulting and there was a lack of awareness that they might be so. Prosecutions may be
instituted only by or with the consent of the Attorney General. See Public Order Act, 1986,
Part III.
79 See 289 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) Col. 370-71 (1997). The Bill, introduced by Mike
Gapes, MP, as the Holocaust Denial Act of 1997, was to amend the Public Order Act of 1986
to include a new section, 5A: "[A]ny words, behaviour or material which purport to deny the
existence of the policy of genocide against the Jewish people and other similar crimes against
humanity committed by Nazi Germany ('the Holocaust') shall be deemed intended to stir up
racial hatred." Id.
'o Law No. 90-615 of July 13, 1990, J.O., July 14, 1990, at 8333; 1990 J.C.P., No. 64046
(Fr.) (amending the French Law on Freedom of the Press of 1881 to permit the suppression
of all racist, antisemitic or xenophobic acts).
"I The United Nations Human Rights Committee upheld Faurisson's conviction, and held
that the conviction did not violate his right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Robert Faurisson v. France, GAOR
Hum. Rts. Comm., 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996).
2 Federal Constitutional Law amending the Prohibition Law, Law No. 148
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 57/1992 (Aus.).
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Union to ban the distribution of racist or xenophobic literature, the excusal or denial
of crimes against humanity, and participation in organizations which advocate or
implicitly support racial discrimination. 3
A. The German Experience
Germany has enacted stringent legislation to prevent race hatred. This legislation
is worth examining in detail as it provides an example of the type of regulations that
Ronald Dworkin and similarly minded liberals criticize. German law also provides
a striking contrast to the approach of the United States Supreme Court.
The German Criminal Code contains far-reaching provisions that outlaw political
activities and organizations, as well as public speech and writings, hostile to the
Basic Law (the Grundgesetz). Germany's Nazi history earlier this century is, of
course, the reason for the existence of such legislation, although the post cold-war
resurgence ofneo-Nazi activities has led to legislative reforms designed to strengthen
these provisions still further." In particular, the need to facilitate prosecution of an
increasingly popular propaganda theme among neo-Nazi groups, the so-called
"Auschwitz lie," motivated the reform of the Criminal Code in 1985 (which was
83 1996 O.J. (L 185) 5. The relevant provision reads as follows:
Title I
A. In the interests of combatting racism and xenophobia, each Member State
shall undertake, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Title II, to ensure
effective judicial cooperation in respect of offences based on the following types
of behaviour, and, if necessary for the purposes of that cooperation, either to take
steps to see that such behaviour is punishable as a criminal offence or, failing
that, and pending the adoption of any necessary provisions, to derogate from the
principle of double criminality for such behaviour:
(a) public incitement to discrimination, violence or racial hatred in
respect of a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by
reference to colour, race, religion or national or ethnic origin;
(b) public condoning for racist or xenophobic purpose, of crimes
against humanity and human rights violations;
(c) public denial of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of
8 April 1945 insofar as it includes behaviour which is contemptuous of
or degrading to a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race,
religion or national or ethnic origin;
(d) public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other
material containing expressions of racism and xenophobia;
1. participation in the activities of groups, organisations or associations,
which involve discrimination, violence, or racial, ethnic or religious
hatred.
Id.
84 See, for example, the amendment to policies on political asylum, supra note 28.
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further amended in October 1994).85 Purveyors of this lie claim that the
extermination of Jews by the National Socialist regime never took place, and that
reports of such actions were deliberate lies formulated to defame Germans and
exploit them financially. 6 Unfortunately, this theme has become a recurrent feature
of efforts made by "revisionist historians" of the Nazi regime, 7 and the troublesome
case of Gunter Deckert"8 shows just how difficult prosecution of this type of hate
crime had become.
Gunter Deckert, leader of the right wing National Democratic Party, organized
a rally at which an American neo-Nazi speaker, Fred Leuchter, claimed there had
never been gas chambers at Auschwitz. 9 Deckert subsequently translated Leuchter's
speech and tried to publish it. He was convicted of inciting hatred.9" The Federal
Supreme Court of Germany (the Bundesgerichtshof) reversed the conviction and held
that publication of another person's denial of the Holocaust could not constitute
incitement to racial hatred.9 The German court remanded the case to the lower court
to decide whether Deckert was in fact guilty of inciting hatred.92 The press widely
criticized the Federal Supreme Court's decision, reflecting the fear among many
Germans that it would become more difficult to prosecute the advocacy of racial
hatred and anti-Semitism.93 In response to the Deckert decision, the legislature
amended section 130 of the Criminal Code94 and created the new crime of "bare
denial of the Holocaust" punishable by up to five years in prison.95 The controversy
did not end there. The lower court reconvicted Deckert but imposed a very light
sentence (one year probation) by holding that his was an honest expression of
85 The 1985 reform amended sections 130 and 131 of the German Criminal Code to
include a provision on the denial of the Holocaust, §§ 130 & 131 StGB, 1985 BGBI. I S.965.
The provision was further amended in 1994, § 130 StGB, BGBI. I S.994 & 186. For a history
of the 1985 amendment, see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law
Against the "Auschwitz "-and Other- "Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986).
86 See discussion infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 84; Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Theses Sur le Rdvisionnisme, in
L'ALLEMAGNE NAZIE ET LE GENOCIDE JUIF 496 (Colloque de I'cole des hautes Ltudes en
sciences sociales ed., 1985).
88 BGH, NJW 1994, 1421.
89 Id. at 1421.
9 Id
91 Id. at 1423.
92 Id. at 1426.
9' See Daniel Beisel, Die Strajbarkeit der Auschwitzluge, NJW 1995, 997 (discussing
criticisms of the decision).
9' § 130 StGB, 1985 BGBI. 1 965.
9' Gesetz zur Anderung der Strafgesetzbuches, der Strafprozeordnung und andere
Gesetz, v.28.10.1994 (BGBI. I S.3186). It is this new legislation which seems to have been
the major target of Dworkin's criticism in his article in The Independent, supra note 4.
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political opinion.' The Federal Supreme Court refused to allow such reasoning to
stand and held that there should be no mitigation of punishment for those who
refused to open their eyes to the truth,'even if they did so out of political conviction.97
This holding contrasts sharply with the United States Supreme Court's privileging
of political speech.
Freedom of expression is an essential feature of the German Constitution. The
free expression provisions of German Constitutional law, however, interact with
measures in the German Criminal Code designed to prohibit racist expression in a
way that would not be possible under American law. Article 5(1) of the German
Basic Law guarantees freedom of expression in the following terms: "Everyone shall
have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and
pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of
the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasting and films are
guaranteed. There shall be no censorship." 9 The boundaries of such freedom of
expression, however, are demarcated by paragraph 2 of Article 5 which states that
"[t]hese rights are limited by the provision of the general laws, the provisions of law
for the protection of youth, and the right to inviolability of personal dignity.' 99 Thus,
present within Article 5 of the Basic Law is a mechanism for placing restrictions on
free speech, which is put into effect by the Criminal Code.
Article 5 also must be viewed in the context of the Basic Law as a whole. The
abuse of freedom which led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the
suppression of freedom during the National Socialist regime contributed greatly to
the form and substance of the Basic Law and subsequent legislation."° Most
importantly, the German Basic Law aims to create a value system based on the
dignity of human beings. The Basic Law's fundamental charter of rights begins with
a clear affirmation of human personhood. Article 1, the basis of all rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, declares: "the dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority."'' The German Constitutional
96 The lower court also made the extraordinary comment that Deckert came from a good
family and his opinions "came from the heart." BGH, NJW 1994, at 1421; and NJW 1995,
at 340 (discussing lower court's decision). Two of the lower court judges subsequently were
relieved of their offices.
" For reports of the Federal Court's decisions, see id.
98 Art. 5.1 GG.
99 Art. 5.2 GG.
"o See Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What Are the Lessons for the Modern
Democracies?, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL
INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993).
... Art. I GG. According to the Federal Supreme Court, this "inviolability of human
dignity is not a mere programmatic statement but 'a directly effective norm' of the objective
constitutional law." BGHSt 32, 535 (citing I.H. V. MANGOLDT & F. KLEIN, DAS BONNER
GRUNDGESETZ 147 (2d ed. 1955)).
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Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has underlined this commitment and has
declared dignity to be the highest legal value of the Basic Law. In a judgment
handed down in 1975 the Constitutional Court declared: "The Basic Law has erected
a value-oriented order which places the individual human being and his dignity at the
centre of all determinations... [and it is] this value judgment of the Constitution that
informs the organisation and interpretation of the entire legal order."1 12 This
hierarchy under the Basic Law explains much of the jurisprudence in this area.
Also, it is argued that basic rights are conferred not only for the benefit of the
individual but also in the public interest, and that the democratic political order must
be protected against their misuse. In Thomas Mann's phrase, the Bonn republic,
unlike the Weimar Republic, is a "militant democracy"-that is, a democracy willing
to defend itself ("wehrhafte Demokratie").' 3 In its 1952 decision banning the neo-
Nazi Socialist Reich party and its 1956 decision banning the Kommuniste Partei
Deutschlands (KPD), the German Constitutional Court claimed that a "value order"
was an element of the "free democratic basic order" and that parties denying these
values placed themselves outside the Constitution."° In 1976, the court upheld the
administrative practice of excluding radicals from the public service: "The
Constitution is not morally neutral but grounds itself on certain central values, takes
them in its protection and gives the state the task of protecting and guaranteeing
them. It establishes a militant democracy." ''
B. Limiting Freedom of Expression Under German Law
Certain provisions of the German Criminal Code are prime examples of the
general laws referred to in Article 5(2) of the Basic Law,"° under which freedom of
expression may be limited. Section 130 of the Criminal Code prohibits attacks on
human dignity likely to breach the public peace by malicious slander or contempt, as
well as incitement to hatred. °7 On the introduction of the original legislation in the
102 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), BVerfGE 39, 1 (67). See also GERHARD
LEIBHOLZ ET AL., GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: KOMMENTAR AN
DER RECHTSPRECHUNG (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the Constitutional Court's human dignity
jurisprudence).
103 See generally WILLIAM E. PATERSON & DAVID SOUTHERN, GOVERNING GERMANY 60
(1991) (describing Germany's adoption of a "democratic-functional theory" of Basic Rights
as mandating that the political order "must be protected against misuse of Basic Rights").
104 See BVerfG 2, 1; BVerfG 5, 85.
105 BVerfGE 39, 334 (349).
,0 Art. 5.2 GG. See also discussion supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107 Section 130 Incitement to Hatred (Volksverhetzung) (§ 130 StGB, 1985 BGBI. I S.
965) reads:
(1) Whoever, in a manner apt to disturb the public peace (order), by
1. Inciting hatred against sections of the population or calling for
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German Bundestag, the Justice Ministry elucidated the concept of "attack on human
dignity" in terminology similar to that used by the highest German courts, namely,
as attacks "'on the core area of [the victim's] personality,' a denial of the victim's
'right to life as an equal in the community,"" 0' or treatment of a victim as "an
inferior being excluded from the protection of the constitution."'' 9
Since its amendment in 1994, section 130(3) also prohibits the approval, denial,
or qualified denial of the Holocaust in the following terms:
Whoever, in a manner apt to disturb public order, publicly or in a
gathering approves or denies or makes appear harmless an act committed
violent or arbitrary measures against them, or
2. Attacks the human dignity of others on the grounds of their being
part of the population by maliciously exposing them to contempt or
slandering them,
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of three months to five years.
Section (2) has recently been added:
(2) The following shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of up to 2
years or by a fine:
1. Writing which incites hatred against a section of the population or against
a group on account of its nationality, race, religion or ethnic origin, calls for
violent or arbitrary measures against them or attacks their human dignity on
the grounds of their belonging to a section of the population or one of the
aforementioned groups by maliciously exposing them to contempt or
slandering them, by
a) disseminating;
b) publicly exhibiting, posting, presenting or otherwise making
available;
c) offering or making available to a person under the age of 18;
d) producing, subscribing to, supplying, stocking, offering,
announcing, recommending, undertaking to import into or export out of
the territory to which this law applies, in order to use them, or pieces
derived from them, in the manner indicated in a) to c) above, or to enable
others to do so, or
2. Disseminating a work with the content listed in paragraph (2)1
through the broadcasting network.
0 Stein, supra note 88, at 285 (quoting Dr. Schafheutle, Ministerialdirektor, Before the
99th Session of the Legal Committee of the German Bundestag, Mar. 17, 1960). Note the
parallels here with feminist arguments, such as those articulated by Catharine MacKinnon,
which stress that allowing the dissemination of pornography as free speech threatens
women's ability to play their parts as equals in the community. See MACKiNNON, supra note
61, at 177. Owen Fiss also favors the regulation of some speech on the basis of allowing fair
and equal participation of the victims of that speech. See FISS, supra note 6, at 26.
.09 Stein, supra note 88, at 285 (quoting Dr. Schafheutle, Ministerialdirektor, Before the
99th Session of the Legal Committee of the German Bundestag (Mar. 17, 1960)).
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under the National Socialist period [in one of the forms listed in section
220(1)] shall be punished by up to [five] years in prison or by a fine."'
This is the so-called "bare Auschwitzltige" under which there is no further
requirement that the proscribed speech incite hatred. Section 131 makes the
production or dissemination of writings which incite racial hatred punishable."'
Also relevant in this context are section 185 of the Criminal Code, which
provides for the punishment of insults" 2 and the original "Auschwitzliige" under
section 194, which prohibits acts of libel or slander that trivialize or deny Nazi crimes
or the crimes of other violent regimes.3
Further case law illustrates how these extensive provisions have been applied in
practice. In a much cited German case from the early 1980s,"14 the defendant was
convicted for posting leaflets on a public wall declaring that the murder of millions
of Jews in the Third Reich was "a Zionist swindle that could not be accepted."'"1
5
The case was dismissed by the Koblenz appeals court,"6 but the Federal Supreme
"l § 130 (3) StGB.
§ 131 StGB. Section 131, entitled Aufstachelung zum Rassenhass (Inciting Race
Hatred), reads:
Whoever disseminates, publicly exhibits, makes available to persons under 18
or otherwise produces writings that:
(1) incite race hatred or describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of
violence, or represent the cruel or inhuman aspects of the occurrence in a
manner offending human dignity, shall be punished by a term of
imprisonment of up to one year or by a fine.
Paragraph (2) covers broadcasting, and Paragraph (3) states that paragraphs (1)
and (2) are not applicable when the act is in the service of reporting on current
events or history.
12 § 185 StGB (stating that insults shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of up to
one year or by a fine and, if the insult is committed by a physical act, by a term of
imprisonment of up to two years or by a fine).
"3 Section 194(1) reads as follows:
1. Prosecution for insults shall be instigated only upon petition. When the act is
committed by disseminating or by making publicly accessible a writing.., or in
an assembly or by means of broadcasting, a petition is not required, if the
insulted person was persecuted as a member of a group under the National
Socialist or another violent and arbitrary dominance, if the group is part of the
population and the insult is connected with such persecution. However, there can
be no prosecution ex officio if the injured person opposes it. The opposition may
not be withdrawn. If the injured person dies, the right of petition and of
opposition passes to the next of kin specified.
§ 194(1) StGB.
114 BGHZ 75, 160.
I ld. at 160.
16 The court reasoned that the insult was not aimed expressly at Jews, but rather at
everyone, including non-Jews, who denied the Auschwitz lie his leaflets propagated. The
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Court reversed the judgment and reinstated the conviction. In the most striking
language, quite unlike anything emanating from the United States Supreme Court,
the German Federal Supreme Court attempted to draw a line between a "mere
falsification of history and injurious invective."" 7 The defendant did not direct the
statements in the pamphlet toward a specific understanding of history, but instead,
by denying the fact of the racial murder of Jews, denied their "inhuman" and
"unique" fate which:
[G]ives every one of them a claim to recognition and respect.... The
single fact that people were singled out under the so-called Nuremberg
laws and were robbed of their identity with a view to their extermination
allocates to the Jews living in the Federal Republic a special personal
relationship with their fellow citizens. In the context of this relationship
the past is present even today. They are entitled, as a matter of their
personal identity, to be viewed as belonging to a fatefully selected group,
to which others owe a special moral responsibility which is part of their
self worth. Respect for their personal identity is for each of them a
guarantee against a return to such discrimination and a fundamental
condition for their living in Germany. Whenever someone tries to deny
these precedents, they deny each of these individuals their personal value.
For this signifies the continuation of discrimination against the group to
which they belong."'
In this way, what appears on its face to be a simple denial of history is seen to
involve far more. Thus, the case may beconsidered as not merely raising free speech
issues. The denial of the past is interpreted as a specific attack on the personal
identity of Jewish people, with profound impact on their self worth. The case cited
above" '9 was decided before the amendments to section 130(3) created a new offense
of denial or approval of the Holocaust, but the German Supreme Court's reasoning
still can help Americans to see why more than free speech is at issue and why certain
speech must be restricted.
The necessity of these laws in Germany is further illustrated by the poignant
contrast with case law from the National Socialist period. For example, in a 1936
decision the Reichsgericht (the pre-1945 German Supreme Court) held that full rights
extended only to those of German origin. The Reichsgericht stated that "fundamental
target audience, thus, was deemed too numerous to fulfill the "particular group" requirement
of section 130. BGHZ 75, 160 (161).
17 Id. at 162. The case was decided prior to the 1994 amendment to section 130 which
made a mere denial of the Holocaust a criminal offense.
118 Id.
9 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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restrictions placed on aliens under former laws are renewed, and ideas again taken
up, which were recognized earlier based upon the differentiation between those with
full legal responsibility and those persons with fewer rights."' 120
There is a marked distinction between the post-war court's concern that
individual identity and dignity be respected, and the Reichsgericht's refusal to
recognize certain groups as having "full legal responsibility and rights." The
Reichsgericht's logic contrasts sharply with post-war universal declarations of rights
and the notion that everyone present within the jurisdiction should gain the same
protection from fundamental rights.'12
The German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, also has had
to consider the constitutionality of prosecutions under the Criminal Code. In 1994,
the Constitutional Court held that orders prohibiting a conference at which the
"revisionist historian" David Irving was to speak did not violate Article 5(1) of the
Basic Law. 2 2 The planned conference was banned due to threatened breaches of
sections 130 and 185 of the Criminal Code.
In the Irving case, the Constitutional Court grappled with the difficulties
involved in banning opinions which often cannot be proven either true or false and,
thus, usually qualify for protection under Article 5(1); the court noted, however, that
false or inaccurate information does not merit constitutional protection. The Court
stressed that under Article 5(1) freedom of speech was not given absolute protection,
but that limitations on speech were permissible according to Article 5(2), and that
rules had been developed for this balancing exercise.2 3 It is particularly interesting
that the Court stressed that protection of personal identity normally would take
precedence over freedom of speech in cases in which the speech took the form of
insults or abuse.2 4 The Court also referred to its earlier Federal Supreme Court
judgment'25 and to the "Auschwitzlige" offense. The Court concluded that even if
the statements made at the conference were merely opinions rather than statements
of fact, in view of the weight that had to be given to injury to dignity, the defendant
could not object to the priority given to protection of personal identity over freedom
.of expression in the contested order'banning the assembly. This position contrasts
boldly with the general refusal of the United States Supreme Court to consider
120 91 Seufferts Archiv fur Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte 65 (1936).
121 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/8 10,
at 71 (1948) ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.").
122 See Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), Apr. 23, 1994, NJW 1994, at
1779.
123 See id. at 1781.
124 See id. at 1782.
,2' See id. at 1782 (citing BGHZ 75, 160 discussed supra notes 114-18 and accompanying
text).
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competing claims of equality in R.A. V v. St. Paul'26 -and in its constitutional
jurisprudence, generally, since New York Times v. Sullivan.27
German jurisprudence thus demonstrates, often in quite extraordinary language,
a way of dealing with the fear that, once certain types of expression are forbidden,
a nation will be on a never-ending downward slope of state regulation and
censorship. Freedom of speech must give way when it proves injurious to other
values which are as essential to a particular society. In the case of Germany, these
other values include the protection of individual dignity in a society still haunted by
its past, as well as preservation of the democratic order itself.
C. Freedom of Expression Under the European Convention
German law, of course, is not the only legal system to place explicit limitations
on the exercise of freedom of expression. In contrast to the First.Amendment, but
in conjunction with Article 5 of the German Basic Law, Article 10 of the European
Convention is not expressed as an absolute; there are eleven different permissible
limitations on freedom of expression under Article 10(2).121
Attempts have been made to translate this approach into action. It is difficult to
maintain that Article 10 has provided a coherent vision of free expression. In some
cases, the Court of Human Rights has shown itself to be a keen defender of free
speech, particularly in the context of political speech. The court's holding in Castells
v. Spain129 is a good example. Castells was a member of the Spanish Parliament who
was charged with insulting the Government by alleging governmental involvement
in right wing killings in the Basque region." '3 Under Spanish law, Castells was not
allowed to plead the truth of his accusations and was convicted and given a heavy
sentence.' The European Court found Spain to be in breach of Article 10, for
"freedom of expression is as a general rule held to be essential in a democratic
126 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 16-22, 49.
127 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
2 See THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 426 (Francis G. Jacobs & Robin
C.A. White eds., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1996). Article 10(2) reads:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities and conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of inforiiiation
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Id.
29 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445 (1992).
"0 See id at 449.
"' See id. at 451.
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society."' While freedom of expression is important for everyone, the court held,
"it is especially so for an elected representative whose very r6le is to act as a
spokesman for the opinions and concerns of his constituents.' 3 3 Accordingly,
"interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition Member of
Parliament, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.' 34
In other cases, the court has shown itself less inclined to champion freedom of
expression and more willing to defer to member state interests, particularly
community morality. In Otto Preminger Institute v. Austria,'35 the Court upheld an
Austrian law that permitted the banning and seizure from a private cinema of a film,
Council of Heaven, because the film offended the strongly Catholic community of
Innsbruck with its portrayal of the Holy Family.'36
Characteristic of all the Article 10 case law, however, is the willingness of the
court to balance the exercise of the right to freedom of expression with its limitation
by legitimate aims under Article 10(2), regardless of whether the limitation is related
to the content of the expression. The court thus is compelled to address the issue of
whether the restriction is "necessary in a democratic society" as required by Article
10(2),' a phrase which the court has not interpreted to mean useful or desirable, but
to correspond to a "pressing social need."'3 In this way, every European court
applying the provisions of the Convention is required to consider the purpose of
restrictions on a Convention right and the proportionality of such restrictions to their
purpose. Simply stated, the restrictions should be no more intrusive than necessary
to accomplish their purpose.'39 The fact that legislation prohibits speech on the
grounds of its content is not, in itself, a reason to hold that legislation in
contravention of the Convention. If R.A. V v. St. Paul4' had fallen under the
jurisdiction of the European Court, that court would have had to scrutinize closely
the state legislature's motive in passing the ordinance, which was to prevent
aggressive behavior of a certain sort, targeted at certain groups. The main focus of
such an inquiry, then, would require the court to consider whether the state's action
132 Id. at 461.
133 Id
14 Id. at 476.
131 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994).
136 For additional examples, see Miler v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (1988)
(confirming the conviction of the organizer of an art exhibition depicting scenes of
bestiality), and Handyside v. United Kingdom, I Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976) (upholding under
Article 10 the conviction of an English publisher who planned to sell obscene books in his
possession).
17 See EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 128, at 426.
"3 Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 754.
"9 See id at 754.
140 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See discussion supra notes 16-22, 49 and accompanying text.
328 [Vol. 7:2
THE HATEFULNESS OF PROTECTED SPEECH
was necessary in response to a "pressing social neod," and in proportion to its
objective.
Not many cases which concern racial vilification or hate speech specifically have
found their way to the Convention institutions.11  Those cases that have been
adjudicated, however, illustrate a willingness by the Convention courts to look to
values other than freedom of expression. A recent application brought by David
Irving against Germany failed.Y2 In this case, Irving claimed that his convictions for
insulting and blackening the memory of the deceased pursuant to sections 185, 189,
and 194 of the German Criminal Code 143 infringed Article 10 of the European
Convention. (Irving had been convicted in Germany for claiming that the gas
chambers found at Auschwitz were actually fakes built in the post-war period.) The
European Commission held that Irving's conviction had been "necessary in a
democratic society" under Article 10(2) and that the public interest in the prevention
of crime and disorder in German society due to insulting behavior against Jewish
citizens, as well as the requirements of protecting their reputation and rights,
outweighed the applicant's freedom to deny the existence of the gas chambers. 4
Similarly, in cases referred from Germany and Belgium concerning the compatibility
with the Convention of prosecution for denial of the Holocaust, the Commission had
14 The scarcity of such cases is surprising, given the increased incidence of hate crimes
in Europe over the past decade. However, because Article 35(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights requires applicants to exhaust national remedies before approaching the
Convention institutions (which themselves proceed slowly because of the sheer volume of
work), it takes cases a long time to work their way to the European Court. See EUROPEAN
CONVENTION, supra note 128, at 431.
A case that both provides an example of the extraordinary amount of time it takes for
Convention institutions to decide a case, and is similar to those discussed in this Article is
Lehideux & Isorni v. France (55/1997/839/1045), Judgment of September 23, 1998, which
was decided too late for consideration in this Article. This case concerned the applicants'
conviction under French law for "public defense of war crimes or the crimes of
collaboration" following the appearance in a national newspaper in 1985 of an advertisement,
placed by the applicants, representing Marshal Philippe Pdtain in a-positive light. Id. at 12.
The European Court of Human Rights held that this conviction violated Article 10 of the
European Convention. Id. at 58. This case may be distinguished from the cases under
consideration in this Article, however, as the applicants had explicitly stated their disapproval
of "Nazi atrocities and persecutions." Id. at 47. The Court specifically stated that "the
Justification of a pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded by
Article 10." Id. at 53.
142 See Application 26551/95 David Irving v. Germany (June 26, 1996). See also
Application 25991/94 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [National Democratic
Party of Germany] v. Germany (Apr. 23, 1994), which appealed a decision of the German
Constitutional Court.
143 §§ 185, 189, 194 StGB.
144 See Application 26551/95 David Irving v. Germany (June 26, 1996).
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no difficulty in finding these prosecutions justifiable under Article 10(2)."' The only
cases on the topic of hate speech to have reached the court are Kosiek v. Germany'46
and more recently Jersild v. Denmark.'47 In Kosiek, a German school teacher
challenged the authorities' refusal to continue his contract on the basis of his extreme
right wing views. The court followed the German government's line of reasoning in
dismissing the claim as one that raised the right to belong to the civil service, which
is not a Convention right, rather than an Article 10 claim. This point is somewhat
tenuous and led to the result that the government's action could not be faulted under
the Convention. 148
The Jersild case concerned the conviction of a Danish journalist under Articles
266(b) and 23(1) of the Danish Penal Code. 49 The journalist was found to have
aided and abetted the dissemination of racist remarks by broadcasting an interview
with a group of Danish skinheads who expressed offensive racist views. 0 The court
held that the conviction was not compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. 5' It
is interesting to note, however, that the conviction of the skinhead group was not
challenged.'52 There was also a substantial dissent (sevenjudges dissented on a panel
of nineteen) in Jersild that articulated the opinion that Jersild should have expressed
disagreement with the skinheads' views. 53 The dissenting judges expressed their
views strongly and placed the case in the context of its time, in a manner which
contrasts sharply with American jurisprudence and is worth repeating in full:
'4 See T v. Belgium, 34 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158 (1983) (holding that the
"restriction on the [plaintiff's] exercise of the freedom of expression was necessary for the
prevention of disorder ... as well as for the maintenance of the authority of the judiciary");
Konen v. Germany, 29 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194 (1982) (holding that prohibiting
an individual from displaying pamphlets denying the Holocaust is necessary to protect the
reputation of others in a democratic society).
146 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 328 (1986).
14 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1994).
41 See Kosiek, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 341-42. This holding may be an example of the
European Court respecting the German principle of "militant democracy," on which the
policy of Berufsverbot (excluding radicals from the German civil service) is based.
149 See Jersild, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 7-11.
50 See id. at 1. Statements in the interview which provided the basis for the conviction
included: "A nigger is not a human being, it's an animal, that goes for all the other foreign
workers as well, Turks, Yugoslavs and whatever they are called." Id. at 5.
'5' See id. at 18.
52 See id at 28.
.53 See id. at 31 (GblcUkla, Russo & Valticos, JJ., dissenting). Interestingly, section 130
of the German Criminal Code contains a requirement that journalists reproduce such
statements with a critique. For example, the documentary film by the film maker Wilfried
Bonengel, Beruf" Neonazi, which contained the antisemitic statements of a far right extremist,
was proscribed under this regulation because it was produced without commentary. See
Beisel, supra note 93.
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While appreciating that some judges attach particular importance to
freedom of expression, the more so as their countries have been largely
deprived of it in recent times, we cannot accept that this freedom should
extend to encouraging racial hatred, contempt for races other than the one
to which we belong, and defending violence against those who belong to
the races in question. It has been sought to defend the broadcast on the
ground that it would provoke a healthy reaction of rejection among the
viewers. That is to display an optimism, which to say the least, is belied
by experience. Large numbers of young people today, and even the
population at large, finding themselves overwhelmed by the difficulties
of life, unemployment and poverty, are only too willing to seek
scapegoats who are held up to them without any real word of
'54caution ....
IV. JUSTIFYING FREE SPEECH
A. Speech, Harm, and Action
The United States and European authorities have illustrated that, whatever the
virtues of freedom of speech, its free exercise can threaten the well-being of others.
Speech, like so many actions humans perform, clearly is not always politically
constructive or inherently self-regarding. It affects others-often very painfully.'
Yet discussions on freedom of expression often proceed as though speech has no
capacity to harm. As recognized under German law, insults and abuse, whether in
words or "symbolic" speech, can cause direct harm in the form of psychic injury to
the victim. 56 Speech also can harm directly by encouraging the victim, or others, to
take immediate hostile action. (This type of harm is the most likely to be recognized
and targeted by legislation.) But such invective, of course, also can cause indirect
harm by helping to form an image in society that those attacked are less than
human,' thereby fostering a situation in which those attacked become less able to
defend themselves against the abuse by the "more speech" recommended by Justice
Brandeis in Whitney.'58 Thus, the victims' right to equality is affected by hateful
114 Jersild, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32 (G6lcoklfl, Russo & Valticos, JJ., dissenting).
"' See Delgado, supra note 6, at 136-49 (detailing the types of harm caused by racist
invective).
156 See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
m See Delgado, supra note 6, at 143-49.
5 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring); discussion supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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speech, as is their ability to respond and participate in public discussion, which is
itself a right of free expression. In short, victims are silenced.1
59
Another related feature of the nature of expression, and one that underlines its
potential to harm, is the difficulty that one may have in distinguishing words from
actions. Conduct such as cross-burning may be classified as speech for the purposes
of the First Amendment, but to many it would be more readily identifiable as an act
of pure aggression, clearly intended to intimidate. It can be very difficult to
distinguish speech from harmful conduct, as Justice Holmes's example of shouting
"fire" in a crowded theater6 ° illustrates, and the treatment of statements such as
"Raise your fares twenty percent, I'll raise mine the next morning" as attempted joint
monopolization, not ordinary speech. 6' J. L. Austin recognized the work that such
"performative utterances" could do when he called them "speech acts."'62 Likewise,
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that pornography is discriminatory conduct as
much as speech.'63 In a recent review of MacKinnon's Only Words, however,
Wojciech Sadurski criticizes those such as MacKinnon who seek to regulate hate
speech and pornography in order to bring about equality by suggesting that such
regulation denies the autonomy and individual responsibility of the hearers.'64
Sadurski also is unwilling to accept the characterization of hateful speech as speech
acts, for reasons which merit a more detailed discussion of the theory of speech acts.
J. L. Austin criticizes the view that presumes that language is primarily
descriptive. As Austin points out, utterances are rarely just statements to be tested
for truth and falsity; most have nothing to do with truth or falsity.'65 Instead, most
utterances are acts: they perform. Thus, Austin calls them performatives, as in, for
example, the "I do" of a marriage ceremony.'66 Such an utterance cannot be
translated into a descriptive form, or at least the attempt to do so does no justice to
the statement. This emphasis on the performative capacity of language reminds one
of the strength and power of words, which already is obvious in insults and racist
"' See Delgado, supra note 6, at 147.
160 See Schenck v. Unites States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (arguing that such speech is
harmful because of its propensity to cause panic).
161 See United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984)
(defining attempted monopolization as a "highly verbal crime"), cited in MACKINNON, supra
note 6, at 12 (noting that the "conviction nicely disproved the defendant's view, expressed
in the same conversation, that we 'can talk about any goddamn thing we want to talk
about').
62 See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 4-17 (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisa eds., 1975).
163 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 22-23.
"6' See Wojciech Sadurski, On 'Seeing Speech Through an Equality Lens': A Critique of
Egalitarian Arguments for Suppression of Hate Speech and Pornography, 16 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 713, 717 (1996).
165 See AUSTIN, supra note 162, at 5.
166 Id. at 5-6.
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invective. A speech-act analysis such as Austin's makes clear the harm that words
may commit.
Sadurski, however, criticizes the application of speech act theory to hate speech
and pornography by maintaining that such "utterances" are, in fact, what Austin
described as perlocutionary in nature. That is, the effects of such "speech" consist
in their causal consequences, of their ability to convince readers and listeners to adopt
certain views, as opposed to the illocutionary or performative sort of utterances which
form what one may regard as traditionally-defined speech acts.'67 According to
Sadurski, the fact that speech has this persuasive effect is no reason to forbid its
publication because to do so would deny the autonomy and individual responsibility
of the listeners.'68 Perlocutionary utterances, then, are classical examples of speech
rather than speech acts and, thus, should benefit from the traditional justifications of
free speech.169
Austin, however, takes the argument further than Sadurski. For Austin, it is not
just obvious performative or illocutionary statements that act, but perlocutionary
statements also can have a vigorous impact. 7° In order to see the executive power
of language one must examine the way it transforms situations in which it occurs.
Sadurski suggests that to count as an illocution a statement must be a verdict on that
matter; it must be based on "institutional facts," to use John Searle's terminology.' 7 '
According to Sadurski, the utterances of pornographers and racists are ineffective as
illocutions if the utterances are not recognized as having either a "special authority"
or the intention to issue a set of rules of conduct for the subject area they address.'72
The strength of speech as an act depends on its immediate transformative
capacity. When a marriage takes place, when war is declared-performative or
illocutionary acts-the world is not the same as it was before. Likewise, the world
it not the same after a "revisionist historian" such as David Irving stands up in
Munich and asserts that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz. A verbally
aggressive act hurtful to many people has taken place and, perhaps, a seed of doubt
has been sown in the minds of others. This fact is underscored by the atavistic rather
than representational, by the distorted, defaced, and essentially violent character of
hate speech, the effects of which are not merely persuasive in nature. Thus, the
strength of Sadurski's argument is lost if the distinction between perlocutionary and
illocutionary acts collapses, as indeed Austin recognized.'73 The suggestion is that
167 See Sadurski, supra note 164, at 718-23.
161 See id. at 717.
169 See id. at 723.
170 See AUSTIN, supra note 162, at 101-32.
171 See JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33-42
(1969).
172 See Sadurski, supra note 164, at 722.
173 See AUSTIN, supra note 162, at 121-47.
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there are good reasons to accept MacKinnon's argument for refusing First
Amendment protection altogether for these types of statements on the basis that they
are not "Only Words." If this is the case, the traditional arguments in favor of free
speech should not be applicable if what is at issue is not, or should not be, protected
speech.
If this argument is not accepted, however, and Sadurski's line of reasoning is
followed, then there is still much to be said about why the traditional arguments for
prioritizing speech are inadequate. Some of the justifications offered by the United
States Supreme Court have been discussed above. What follows is an attempt to
place these justifications into a broader philosophical context.
B. The Argument for Truth
The "argument for truth" is perhaps the most well-known ofjustifications for free
speech, and it is becoming somewhat care-worn in spite of having a good pedigree.
Freedom of speech, freedom of inquiry, and the freedom to criticize are necessary,
so this argument goes, in order for citizens to be able to distinguish truth from
falsehood. Milton's argument in the Areopagitica"' is based to some extent on the
premise that the absence of government restrictions on publishing will enable society
to locate truth and reject error. John Stuart Mill also posited the search for truth as
the foundation of his plea for liberty of thought and discussion.'75 Starting from the
premise that the opinions suppressed on account of their supposed falsity may in fact
turn out to be true, or to contain a portion of truth, Mill argued that the elimination
of suppression consequently would increase the likelihood of exchanging error for
truth. "'76 This theme also has surfaced in judicial opinions in the United States.
Justice Frankfurter's observation in Dennis v. United States is typical:
The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of
error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have
yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth
ought not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge. 77
Several questions arise with respect to such an approach: first, the nature of the
truth to which freedom of expression is supposed to lead-and whether this truth is
in fact a valuable objective and, second, whether freedom of expression actually
increases the probability of attaining truth.
'7 See MILTON, supra note 39; discussion supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
115 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY passim (Stefan Collini ed., 1989).
176 See id. at 20-24, 47-53.
177 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951).
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The first issue stems from skeptical arguments regarding the epistemological
status of truth claims. The view that free speech will enable the United States to
reach the truth relies on a certain type of rationalism (often denigrated as resting on
"Enlightenment values"). This view presupposes that one can test empirically the
beliefs or facts underlying speech with regard to self-evident truths. That is to say,
this theory is based on a worldview in which truth is absolute and objective. This
worldview certainly is not accepted universally. For many, truth is a relative concept
and what is true in one community may be entirely false in another. As well, a great
amount of speech seems to have no truth value at all; many opinions are simply not
verifiable (unless one accepts the view that truth is a matter of coherence with a given
set of beliefs7 '). One may attempt to avoid such relativism by confining oneself
solely to speech based on facts capable of verification and excluding all value
judgments, or highly speculative claims. But this is not a satisfactory remedy. Most
existing free speech guarantees extend protection to opinions as well as facts.'79
Libel laws otherwise would be extremely draconian. J. L. Austin's theory of speech
acts also surely must provide another blow to the claim that free speech will help
citizens find truth, given his view that most utterances have nothing to do with truth
or falsity but, instead, are performative acts rather than reflections of reality. 80
On the other hand, if "the truth" could be proven objectively, would there be any
reason to reject the point made by the Victorian jurist James Fitzjames Stephen that
if one could be absolutely certain that a proposition were true and its negation false,
then there would be no reason not to suppress the negation? 8' Clear error surely
does nothing to help citizens in their search for truth. Stephen's approach seems to
have been adopted under German law, in which plain denial of the Holocaust is taken
to be a clearly false claim and, thus, unworthy of protection under the free expression
provisions of the German Constitution. 2 Some writers have suggested that falsity
is necessary for confirmation of the truth,'83 but falsity may in fact be more appealing
than the truth or, in the words of the Williams Committee report: "Against the
principle that truth is strong and (given the chance) will prevail, must be set
Gresham's Law, that bad money drives out good."'84
78 See, e.g., RALPH C.S. WALKER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OFTRUTH: REALISM, ANTI-
REALISM, IDEALISM (1989).
' See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, 420-21 (1986) (declaring value
judgments-i.e., opinions-to be an essential element of freedom of the press).
180 See AUSTIN, supra note 161, at 4-7.
181 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (R.J. White ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 84-98.
183 See, e.g., 1 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 123-24 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1966) (1945).
184 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON OBSCENITY AND FILM CENSORSHIP 55 (Bernard
Williams ed., 1979) (arguing that Gresham's Law, which "predicts that it will not necessarily
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The requirement that truth be subject to objective perception may strike some as
overbold and unsophisticated. Truth may still exist, and free discussion,
communication, and expression may still render it more accessible, even if it cannot
necessarily be identified. But such justifications are questionable. For example,
suppose any allegiance to an objective theory of truth is abandoned in favor of a
"survival" theory of truth-that is, the view that truth is a matter of whatever survives
in the market. This approach has, of course, accrued support from distinguished
members of the United States judiciary, most notably Justice Holmes.'85 It is also
implicit in Justice Frankfurter's previously quoted statement in Dennis."6 But
survival theories of truth can produce bizarre and undesirable results. If truth is
merely that which survives in any particular marketplace of ideas, then surely this
view implies that National Socialism was "right" in Germany in the 1930s or that
slavery in the United States was correct prior to the Civil War. 87 One suspects that
few in the United States are willing to accept the implications of this unpalatable
form of moral relativism.
Abandoning objectivity simply does not help free speech absolutists. It may be
the case that whatever one believes to be true depends on the evidence deemed
relevant to truth or falsity. But even if this is so, there is no such thing as
"ideologically unconstrained" speech.'88 For if this is the way one assesses truth,
then one remains within the constraints of one's community discourse. From this
perspective, the objectivity sought by American constitutional law is simply an
impossibility.
The second critique of the "argument for truth" is related to the first, and arises
when one moves from making general statements such as "truth is promoted by free
inquiry" to specifying the conditions for free inquiry that will promote truth (or, for
that matter, some other favorable outcome). Society must attempt to ensure that its
more powerful elements, particularly those with greater access to the media, do not
dominate, shout down, or silence weaker but possibly truer voices. If truth is so
valuable, the question remains whether the state should intervene to ensure that all
opinions are equally accessible-a view advocated by Owen Fiss as a reason for
be the most interesting ideas or the most valuable works of art that survive competition," has
.implications for cultural discourse).
185 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); supra
text accompanying note 44.
16 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951); supra text accompanying note
177.
187 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 21 (1982)
(opposing the adoption of a "majority rule" approach to truth).
"88 See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING
Too 102 (1994) (arguing that societies must restrict some speech in order to be faithful to
their core values).
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regulating hate speech." 9 Furthermore, all members of society may not be in
positions to be able to choose between ideas. John Stuart Mill, for example, assumed
an educated, middle class audience whose members would be able to make up their
own minds.' 90 Not all members of society are in such a position-and even those
who are come armed with many biases and assumptions. One who sympathizes with
these issues may feel that "truth" (whatever it may be) would be better protected by
something other than an ideological free-for-all.
C. Expression and Autonomy
In the literature on freedom of communication, it is common to find references
to "the intrinsic worth of the communicative experience"'g -that is, the value of
communication in and of itself. On closer inspection, however, it can be difficult to
disentangle such rationales from their consequentialist cousins. The most common
justification of freedom of speech that does not look to its supposedly beneficial
consequences is based on respect for the moral responsibility or autonomy of
others-the view that people should be free to make up their own minds.19 This
view, of course, is grounded in liberal notions of self-respect, autonomy, and self-
expression. Ronald Dworkin, in making an argument for freedom of speech based
on these grounds, wrote:
Freedom of speech is valuable, not just in virtue of the consequences it
has, but because it is an essential and "constitutive" feature of a just
political society that government treat all its adult members ...as
responsible moral agents .... Government frustrates and denies that
aspect of moral personality when it disqualifies some people from
exercising these responsibilities on the ground that their convictions make
them unworthy participants.' 93
The instrumental and "constitutive" grounds need not be mutually exclusive.
Mill endorses both, 94 as did Justice Brandeis in Whitney: "Those who won our
189 See Fiss, supra note 6, at 18-21.
190 See MILL, supra note 175.
'9' Tom Campbell, Rationales for Freedom of Communication, in FREEDOM OF
COMMUNICATION 17 (Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994).
192 See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 56-57; see also Sadurski, supra note 164, at 717;
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972);
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334(1991).
'91 Dworkin, supra note 24, at 57.
194 See MILL, supra note 175, passim.
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independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; ... they valued liberty both as an end and as a means."'95
It may be argued, however, that the autonomy-based arguments really do not
argue for free speech as a good in and of itself, but rather promote autonomy, which
a liberal society considers to be extremely valuable. Stanley Fish makes this general
point when he insists: "Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself, but is
always produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good to
which it must yield in the event of conflict."'" For Fish, any defense of free speech
must be instrumental: "You assert, in short because you give a damn, not about
assertion-as if it were a value in and of itself-but about what your assertion is
about."'9 7 Consequentially, free speech as a means sometimes must yield when
autonomy and respect for personality are supported better by its restriction, as the
German judgments illustrate.
D. Against an Individualistic Conception of Personhood
Even if it is possible for a free-standing justification of free speech to exist,
serious problems still remain with respect to the liberal theory of the person
underlying American conceptions of free speech. Feminist theorists claim that an
emphasis on autonomy reveals an isolationist and invariably male conception of
personhood, which is ill-equipped to deal with issues of gender, class, or race. 9
Communitarian. critics claim to provide ajustification for laws that punish racially
or religiously bigoted expression, based on the necessity of such laws to the integrity
of the community. Such criticism proceeds from the Aristotelian thesis that humans
are incomplete as individuals because they can develop and exercise distinctively
human capacities only through participation in group life.'99 According to
communitarians, permitting hate speech significantly harms individuals and the
political community as a whole because religious and racial affiliations are central to
the identities of many individuals. One cannot disregard such sensibilities, as liberals
suppose, while simultaneously respecting the personhood of individuals who
experience them.
195 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
196 FISH, supra note 188, at 104.
197 Id. at 107.
198 See SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 156-58 (1992) (noting the narcissistic male's
definition of female as opposite of himself); ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE
POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL COMMUNITARJAN DEBATE
54 (1993) (discussing the deficiencies of theories regarding abstract individuals).
'99 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1985);
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1985).
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Those of a more liberal persuasion, however, might respond with a line of
questioning well-known in this field: "Yes, but where do we draw the line? How do
we avoid sliding down the slippery slope on which any attempt to regulate in one
area will lead to the complete legal subjugation of the individual?"2 0 Which
communities should be protected against speech offensive to them? If a
predominantly Jewish community should be permitted to prohibit a Nazi
demonstration, then why should not a segregated white community similarly be
permitted to bar a civil rights rally? In response, it has been suggested that this "thin
end of the wedge" issue can be resolved by accepting a particular conceptual
distinction between "constitutive" and "instrumental" communities.20 ' According to
communitarians, most groups, whether professional, educational, or political, are
"instrumental" communities. Such communities exist as means of pursuing shared
goals and are dedicated to interests formed by individuals prior to membership.
Therefore, a person's identity is separable from such affiliations, even though
membership in these groups may have a significant impact on that individual's life.
"Constitutive" communities, however, are distinctive because of the effect they have
in forming their members' identities. One may regard very close-knit religious
groups or, perhaps more salient to this discussion, groups with distinct ethnic or
racial identities as examples. Thus, communitarians conclude that respecting
individuals as persons requires the restriction of group vilification only when it is
aimed at constitutive affiliations, because only these affiliations are inseparable from
individual identity. 20 2
Wojciech Sadurski has criticized this view by asserting that communitarian
arguments only pretend to draw the line between constitutive and instrumental
communities:
In fact, I suspect that the operative line is between those communities of
which we approve and those of which we do not.... A Ku Klux Klan
member may well be psychologically and morally affiliated with his
organization to a higher degree than many other people are with their
nations or their religions. . . . Hence, the distinction between
"constitutive" and "instrumental" groups is just a proxy for a substantive
judgment about those groups' identities and whether or not they deserve
200 Robert Post, for example, compares attempts to regulate speech with the attempts
during the Spanish Inquisition to punish actions by Jewish and Moorish converts-to the
extent that the Inquisition concluded that "eating couscous or disliking pork were themselves
punishable as heresy." Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 270 n.14 (1991).
201 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147-54 (1982)
(evaluating John Rawls's theory of community).
202 See, e.g, Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV.
682, 689-94 (1988).
1999] 339
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
protection.... If we are prepared to engage in such a value judgment
about the worthiness of some sensibilities that deserve protection, then we
must face the consequences of unrestrained majoritarianism.2 °3
It is possible to extend protection to certain individuals or groups who have been
targeted for vilification, without either falling down the slippery slope posited by so
many liberal critics or succumbing to Sadurski's "unrestrained majoritarianism."
This extension can be achieved by placing a firm emphasis on other values which
liberal democratic society itself recognizes and respects, such as dignity and equality,
as well as seeking to restrain some speech when it threatens the ability of others to
participate and play their part in a democratic community. Some European case law
does so protect,2" but further theoretical amplification is set out in the next section.
E. Free Speech and Participatory Democracy: A Way Forward?
Scholars sometimes justify freedom of speech as promoting the flourishing of
participatory democracy. This, they suggest, is possible only if government does not
censor certain viewpoints. Democracy, according to the Madisonian view (cited
approvingly by Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan) requires that people,
not government, should decide which views on political issues should prevail." 5 The
writings of Alexander Meiklejohn, according to whom freedom of speech is "a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage,"2" employ this form of justification. Connections also may be
drawn with John Hart Ely's theory of judicial review which stresses the importance
of citizens' participatory rights.2"7
There are some difficulties involved, however, in embracing such a broad free
speech principle. As Ronald Dworkin noted in his commentary on Justice Brennan's
Sullivan opinion,"' this view does not explain why the majority of people should not
203 Wojciech Sadurski, Racial Villification, Psychic Harm, and Affirmative Action, in
FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION 80-81 (Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 76-154.
205 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
206 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 39
(1948). See also DAVID HUME, OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1817), reprinted in DAVID
HUME'S POLITICAL ESSAYS 3-11 (Charles W. Hendel ed., 1953); BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A
THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE ch. XX (1689), reprinted in BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A
THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE AND A POLITICAL TREATISE 257-66 (R.H.M. Lewis trans.,
1951).
207. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
passim (1980). Meiklejohn also presented his arguments as a theory of United States
constitutional interpretation. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 206.
208 See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 56.
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be allowed to impose censorship that they approve of and want-that is, the "tyranny
of the majority" referred to by de Tocqueville. 9 and Mill.21 If democracy simply
means that the majority should have its way, then this justification provides the
United States with no reason why the majority should compromise its will by
providing for freedom of speech if it does not wish to do so.
The general theory of human rights, however, is premised on the necessity of
placing restraints on the majority at times; as well, contemporary visions of
democracy tend to reject the majoritarian view as inadequate by focusing instead on
ensuring participation of all members of society. The European Court of Human
Rights constantly has emphasized in its case law, particularly in the area of freedom
of expression, that it sees "tolerance and broadmindedness" as essential features of
democratic society."' But this interpretation of democracy does not produce a right
of freedom of speech with the strength of the First Amendment, as Karl Popper's
"paradox of tolerance" illustrates. According to Popper, it is paradoxical to allow
freedom of speech to those who would use it to destroy the very freedoms and
toleration on which such a vision of democracy is based.2"2 This argument has not
been well received in American jurisprudence. For example, it was used
unsuccessfully by those who sought to ban the neo-Nazis from marching in Skokie.213
Many European legal systems, however, have been much more willing to restrict
rights when the exercise of those very rights threatens the foundations of civilized
society. For example, Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights
states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.214
The European Commission on Human Rights relied on Article 17 in its decision in
Glimmerveen and Hagenbech v. The Netherlands, and held that the defendants'
conviction for inciting racial discrimination by urging the removal of immigrants
from the Netherlands did not interfere with their free expression rights." Similarly,
Article 18 of the German Basic Law, which provides that certain basic rights are
209 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248-52 (Henry Reve trans.,
Arlington House 1966) (1835).
210 See MILL, supra note 175, passim.
21 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 754 (1976).
212 See POPPER, supra note 183, at 265 n.4.
213 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
214 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 427.
215 See 18 Eur. Comm'n Dec. Rep. 187 (1979).
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forfeited if abused "to combat the free democratic order," '16 also has been used in
cases involving the banning of neo-Nazi parties.217 The German constitutional
principle of militant democracy, of course, also is built on these premises. In the
European cases, neither judges nor lawyers seemed to be worried inordinately by the
difficulties involved in singling out those groups that might constitute a threat to
democracy.
Several writers, including Hans Kelsen, Jurgen Habermas, and Emile Durkheim,
have emphasized the importance to democracy of an open communicative
structure.2 " Furthermore, those who reject some of liberalism's fundamental aspects
have provided support for the argument from democracy. In stressing that power
ultimately rests with people as a group or community, the argument from democracy
avoids criticisms which are made of the atomistic and elitist nature of liberalism. So,
although the stress placed by Habermas, for example, on a model of ideal
communication initially might seem attractive to free speech absolutists (as it puts
discussion at center stage), it must be noted that the Habermasian call for free
discussion also requires the removal of inequality and oppression in society, while
controlling biased speech and affording minorities protection by positive assistance.
This assistance sometimes also may involve silencing the powerful (for example, by
placing restrictions on ownership or control of the media or the amount of money
spent on campaign financing). Owen Fiss reached a similar conclusion, citing the
"silencing" effect of unrestrained speech as a reason for some restrictions on its
exercise. 2 19
The argument from democracy illustrates that it is particularly important to
protect political speech (because of the role it plays in safeguarding democracy),
while at the same time appreciating that restrictions on speech may be necessary to
safeguard democracy. This view runs counter to the usual argument that free speech
is the bedrock of democracy, which enables the United States to applaud decisions
on political speech taken by the European Court of Human Rights-the language in
the Castells and Lingens judgments, for example, echoes the United States Supreme
Court in Sullivan220-while not seeing a reason to pursue this firm approach in other
216 Art. 18 GG.
217 See, e.g., BVerfGE 38, 23.
211 See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 89 (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., Greenwood Press 1958) (1950); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 81 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 284-86 (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell 1973)
(1961).
219 See FISS, supra note 6, at 5-26.
220 See also Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153 (1991)
(the "spycatcher" case) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964));
Derbyshire v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993 All. E.R. 1011, 1019 (denying Public
Authorities the right to sue in libel on the basis that "such actions would place an undesirable
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areas of expression. The argument from democracy allows the United States to argue
for a strong core right of freedom of expression, without taking the United States as
far as Dworkin would like, while acknowledging that there may be times when the
purposes for which free expression is pursued force the United States to compromise
free expression for the ultimate goal of democracy.
V. CONCLUSION: INSENSITIVITY TO OTHER VALUES?
There clearly is a radical difference between the German or, more generally, the
European and American approach to the regulation of speech. It is helpful to identify
two distinctive features of the European approach. First, European and, especially,
German jurisprudence emphasize particular values-dignity, protection of personal
identity, and equality. German judgments stress the potential of racist insults and
denials of Nazi atrocities to affect the very core of the identities of members of
certain groups, even if those individuals have not been specifically targeted for abuse.
This approach 'ecognizes a different sort of harm caused by the abuse of freedom
than the danger of imminent lawless action required under American law. The
Brandenburg requirement that violence be imminent before hateful speech may be
proscribed is objectionable. Different listeners respond in different ways to so-called
fighting words. Not all react by violence-particularly those who are old, sick, or
weak. This type of legislative response privileges a particular type of angry "macho"
reaction without addressing the often more severe harm caused in other cases in
which the victim may be too frightened to respond.221 European case law looks not
only to the harm caused by such expression, but also proceeds from a particular
conception of individual personality and psychology. The European courts' view is
a long way from the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Cohen v.
California, that individuals should "avert their eyes" in cases of offensive
expression.222 In this way, European case law rejects a conception of individuals as
beings who merely should be left to their own devices to make up their own minds
about the value of expression in the public domain, to be free to ignore it, or to
counter it with more speech. Such an approach isolates human beings by forcing
them to take the consequences of painful conduct and ignores the particular
susceptibility of certain groups to injury, especially when the offense of the speech
seems to be targeted at such groups because of their identity. Under the American
model, the individual will be left to his or her less communal and somewhat atomistic
223
existence.
fetter on freedom of speech").
221 See Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
L. REV. 287 (1990).
222 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
223 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 109-70 (1991) (exploring this particular
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In contrast, modem European precedents reveal a different conception of the
individual. For example, the German Constitutional Court has stated: "The concept
of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated sovereign individual; rather the
Basic Law resolves the conflict between the individual and the community by
relating and binding the citizen into the community, but without detracting from his
individuality.
224
Furthermore, the First Amendment tends to eclipse other constitutional values
with which it comes into contact. This problem is particularly acute with respect to
the issue of equality. Catharine MacKinnon's work is indicative of a growing body
of opinion in the United States which believes that "[tihe law of equality and the law
of freedom of speech are' on a collision course. 225 MacKinnon notes that this state
of affairs stands out in bold relief in the United States, where "both rights have been
highly developed but out of sight of each other., 226 The Supreme Court's
insensitivity to the dynamics of equality in this context is illustrated well by the lack
of any reference in R.A. V to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Second, the European approach is fundamentally more sympathetic to a
conception in which the state plays a role in facilitating the realization of freedom,
democracy, and equality. Under the European approach, it becomes natural for the
state to assume a more affirmative role in actualizing specific constitutional rights.
Within the area of freedom of speech this would require the state not only to refrain
from violating certain constitutional norms, but also to participate in their
realization-an approach which usually is assumed only to be required of socio-
economic rights, such as the right to work. The realization of socio-economic rights
is scorned by some because of the degree of government intervention required.227
The European Court emphasized this approach in Informationsverein Lentia v.
Austria2 8 in which it held that, in order to guarantee pluralism the State must take
active steps to promote a variety of sources of information. In the United States,
however, regulation of speecl is likely to be struck down not only when it
discriminates on the basis of content, but also when it is intended to promote equal
opportunities for the dissemination of speech; there is little sympathy for the broader,
more balanced approach found in Europe. Thus, in its holding in Miami Herald v.
Tornillo,2 9 the Supreme Court was hostile to legislation which ensured a right of
reply for those castigated by the press, although the right to broadcast such attacks
was upheld.
criticism of American constitutional rights jurisprudence).
224 BVerfGE 30, 1 (20).
225 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 71.
226 Id.
227 See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 65-77 (1973).
221 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93 (1993).
229 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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Of course, the privileging of speech is not presented as such. Instead, it is
presented in terms of a desire to foster neutrality and to condemn content-based
regulation of expression. As Cass Sunstein recently has claimed, however, neutrality,
in the sense demanded by free speech, may not have neutral effects: "Rules that are
content-neutral can, in light of an unequal status quo, have severe harmful effects on
some forms of speech."23 Laurence Tribe also sees such neutrality as liable to
produce decisions that affect some groups more than others, such as those which do
not have access to adequate financial resources."' Tribe points to the unwillingness
of the United States Supreme Court to "take account of background institutions of
power and the costs of participation in public dialogue" as giving rise to a serious
threat to rights of expression of the disadvantaged.232
Surely it is not enough for societies that claim to be committed to the ideals of
social and political equality and respect for individual dignity to remain neutral and
passive when threats to these values exist. Sometimes the state must act to show its
solidarity with vulnerable minority groups and its commitment to equality. Laws
prohibiting racist speech are an important component of this commitment, as Chief
Justice Dickson noted in the Keegstra case. 33 Sometimes the State must take steps
to protect democracy itself, which may involve repressing speech-a notion that finds
support in the German Constitutional Court's theory of militant democracy as well
as in decisions under the European Convention which look to Article 17 of the
Convention for support.
Contrary to what Dworkin would argue, freedom does not require the United
States to sacrifice permitting hate speech. Rather, some of the values relied on by
free speech adherents, such as autonomy, respect for personhood, and equal
participation in democracy, dictate the regulation of such hateful utterances. If the
joint European Union action against racism, xenophobia, and hate speech,' is to be
230 SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 178.
23 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 194-95 (1985) (discussing how
the prohibition of placing "mailable matter" in recipients' mailboxes without using the postal
service may appear neutral but, according to Tribe: "[T]he regulation, by restricting the
favored means of communication of less wealthy people, augments the voice of the rich.").
232 Id. at 198. This observation leads to a further, related point. Private concerns,
particularly media monopolies, currently are usurping individuals as rights bearers and can
be just as threatening to individual rights as can the State. There is a growing body of case
law on commercial expression under the European Convention, the leading case being Markt
Intern and Beermann v. Germany, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161 (1989). Sir Stephen Sedley, in
Human Rights: a Twenty First Century Agenda, Autumn, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 396, asks:
[W]hy of all the human rights issues there are should it be the issue of free
speech which is constantly at the head of the queue for rights adjudication? The
answer is very clear: it is because for the mass media free speech is a valuable
commodity and litigation a worthwhile investment in it.
233 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
234 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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effective, many member states must introduce new legislation, which inevitably will
be controversial. A test for state intervention might proceed along the following
lines. When the speech concerned attacks the dignity and equality of those targeted,
to the extent that their own ability to participate freely and equally in public
discussion is affected in a way that undermines the democratic nature of the polity,
then this speech constitutes a "harm" worthy of regulation. This type of harm already
is recognized under the European Convention and in German law. This test is based
on equality and also on ensuring that everyone's speech rights are respected. It will
involve the targeting of different types of speech in different times and societies.
Contrary to Dworkin, this Article argues for restrictions on hate speech. A
willingness to ban hate speech, however, does not necessitate the eclipse of free
expression as the strong ideology of free expression of cases such as Castells
illustrates.
In conclusion, Sigmund Freud reminds us of the power and complexity of
language: "By words one person can make another person blissfully happy or drive
him to despair, by words the teacher conveys his knowledge to his pupils, by words
the orator carries his audience with him and determines their judgements and
decisions. Words provoke affects and are in general the means of mutual influence
among men."23
235 SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1916), reprinted
in 15 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 17 (James Strachey ed., 1963).
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